Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1971

Article 7

4-1971

Book Reviews
Charles Galbreath
George F. Shinehouse, Jr.
Norman A. Coplan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles Galbreath; George F. Shinehouse, Jr.; and Norman A. Coplan, Book Reviews, 24 Vanderbilt Law
Review 655 (1971)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/7

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
How Harmless is Harmless?
The Riddle of Harmless Error. By Roger J. Traynor. Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1970. Pp. ix, 117. $6.00
Poets would have us believe that beauty is in the eyes of the beholder
and that nothing is either good or bad unless thinking makes it so.
Equally as elusive is the legal concept of harmless error, the
determination of which capriciously depends on who is applying what
test and the manner in which it is applied. Just how should a judge decide
whether an error is harmless? In this short, provocative, and extremely
readable treatise, Justice Roger J. Traynor analyzes the history and
application of the rule of harmless error. In the last century, the rule was
applied so that any failure, however slight, to dot the "i's" and cross the
"t's" of a legalistic requirement would be fatal error. Trivial mistakes,
such as misspelling the word larceny' or failing to set out in an
indictment that property taken from the victim by force and threats was
not owned by the defendant, 2 were found by some nineteenth century
judges to be incurable omissions because the indictment did not
adequately inform the defendant of the full nature of the charges against
him. Presently, however, even violations of constitutional rights during
trial may be forgiven. There have been recent instances in which clear
violations of defendants' rights guaranteed by the fifth and sixth
amendments have been held permissible if the other evidence of guilt was
so overwhelming that a court could describe the error as "harmless
' 3
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This book is based on the author's experience of more than 30 years
on the California Supreme Court and his exhaustive research into the
enigma of harmless error. The overriding message is simply that there is
no clear explanation for the Supreme Court's preferring the Chapman
test of "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" over the California test,
which allows the judgment to stand if the particular error did not result
1. People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406 (1880).
2. People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345 (1863).
3. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (confessions by co-defendants implicated
defendant and violated confrontation clause but conviction was affirmed because of overwhelming
direct evidence); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (conviction reversed because State
could not show that prosecutor's comments on defendant's failure to testify were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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in a "miscarriage of justice" 4 in the opinion of the reviewing court.
When jury verdicts in criminal cases are appealed, Traynor observes that
there are many who view the problem of evaluating the influence of error
on a juror as defying rational solution. "How," Traynor questions,
"can anyone determine what went on in the minds of another or of
twelve others who served as triers of fact?" (p.23). An attempt to do so
places the appellate reviewer in the position of arrogating the prerogative
of the jury.
The treatise cites illustrations of the difficulty of distinguishing
between errors that affect the outcome of a case to the detriment of a
defendant's rights and those that are so innocuous that they can truly be
said to be harmless. In the foreword, the author points out that all trial
records contain errors that "are the insects in the world of law, traveling
through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession" (p. ix).
Most are harmless; some are devastatingly harmful.
Of primary concern to the author is the impact on the overall
judicial process of the permissiveness suggested in the Chapman rule and
the broader consideration of just what purpose the harmless error rule is
designed to accommodate. Is it for the benefit of society or the
individual? In this light, it is interesting to speculate, for example, about
what would have been the actual harm if Lee Harvey Oswald or Sirhan
Sirhan had been denied some basic constitutional right. Their guilt
might have been so clear to the reviewing court that it would have been
obvious that the infringement of a right by the trial court had not had the
slightest effect on the outcome of the case. Is the defendant of primary
concern in this type of situation, or the law itself? If the defendant's right
to confront an accuser is taken away by an erroneous action amidst
overwhelming evidence of guilt, does the declaration of harmless error
weaken the constitutional structure of protections available to all by
implying to the trial courts that under certain circumstances a
constitutional mandate may be ignored with impunity? 5
One important area of the harmless error problem not discussed by
Justice Traynor is the situation in which a number of errors infect a
given case, each of which is plainly harmless when viewed individually,
but whose cumulative weight renders improbable a fair trial. Clearly,
some errors are synergistic and disproportionately compound the impact
on the whole.
In his essay, Traynor opts for what he terms the "highly probable"
4. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
5. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (where a violation of the sixth amendment
confrontation clause was harmless error).
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rule, which makes affirmance of any judgment in the face of error
conditional on an affirmative finding of high probability that the error
did not affect the judgment. While this still leaves the ultimate
determination to judicial discretion, Traynor feels that this rule requires
the judge to weigh more carefully the issue presented and tends to "hold
down excesses either of affirmance that recklessly dampens assurance of
a fair day in court or of reversal that needlessly calls for still another fair
day at the expense of litigants who are still awaiting their first day in
court" (p. 51). This is a result devoutly to be wished.
This little book should be in every judge's library.
CHARLES GALBREATH*

A Small Business Primer
BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK. Edited by Jim McCord &
Nicholas S. Vazzana. New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1970. Pp.
xviii. 489. $20.00.
ADVISING THE SMALL

The small businessman in our complex society has come to rely
upon attorneys for something more than pure legal advice. Counsel
representing business clients must be prepared to guide the enterprise in
the collateral areas where basic business problems are closely
intertwined with the law. Management and finance are the most obvious
areas in which the lawyer's role becomes important, and in some
instances indispensable. Recognizing the attorney's role as adviser to the
small business, the editors have compiled a "sourcebook" with the
avowed purpose of providing a "ready source of reference materials" (p.
i) and suggestions for improving the attorney's fulfillment of this
advisory function. The term "sourcebook" is an innovation that aptly
describes the content of the book. No attempt is made to cover in depth
the various applicable principles. Rather the subject matter is presented
in capsule form, serving somewhat as an expanded syllabus. In this sense
the book is truly a "sourcebook," or point of beginning, directing the
reader to other texts in which the subject is treated in greater detail.
The method of presentation follows the format of the material used
in Continuing Legal Education courses. This is not surprising since the
book is published by the Practicing Law Institute (PLI) as the first of
*

Judge, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. LL.B. 1947, Cumberland University; J.D.

1968, Samford University.
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the series of Commercial Law and Practice Sourcebooks. The text
comprises a collection of articles by prominent experts in their respective
fields; most of the articles have previously been published as part of
other PLI courses on corporate and commercial subjects. The
arrangement follows a chronological pattern, beginning logically with
the organizing of a new business, and considering state and federal
regulation of securities, mergers, acquisitions and sales, financing,
management, and estate planning for the ultimate disposition of the
business. The subject of taxation has been purposely omitted because
extensive revisions in the tax laws are contemplated.
Much of the material included is business oriented as opposed to
traditional legal orientation in similar treatises. More than one-half of
the text deals with management and financing, including a cursory
discussion of financial statements and accounting methods. Although a
lawyer advising a small business must be familiar with these matters,
legal training in these areas tends to be somewhat deficient.
The editors have included in Part Six articles on franchising,
restitution, and damages for price discrimination, which together with
the chapters on estate planning are characterized as "Special
Problems." This part is mainly a catchall for problems related to the
small business but outside the normal scope of a handbook on advice to
small businesses. The pages devoted to this part might have been better
utilized by expanding the material on corporate control agreements,
going public, and partnerships, or including chapters on employee
contracts, deferred compensation, or basic tax principles.
The book is an excellent introduction to the subject of advising the
small business. Its function is necessarily that of a course book, as well
as a sourcebook. The lawyer experienced in a business practice will find
little in this book to add to his knowledge and experience. The general
practitioner with only occasional small business clients, however, can
utilize the books as a ready-reference and general guide that will direct
his attention to the problems to be anticipated, provide a source for more
detailed research, and put him on speaking terms with practical business
problems his client will encounter. The young lawyer or student will find
much practical information that will introduce him to those areas of
business practice of which he must be cognizant, and help him appreciate
the fact that the small businessman requires more than legal advice from
his attorney.
The editors have recognized the limitations of the book. The
editorial note introducing Part Four frankly states that the material on
financing is intended to serve "at least as a refresher, if not a first-
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instance source of education, to counsel regarding the business
considerations and needs of his client" (p. 173). Moreover, the principal
theme of the book is stated as the need of counsel to "synthesize his legal
considerations with those of a business nature entertained by his client in
order to guide the client successfully through the varieties of
transactions" (p. 173), in which he seeks the advice of counsel. These
comments characterize the entire book. The editors have made their
point. The book is recommended for its intended but limited purpose,
namely a "sourcebook."
GEORGE F.

SHINEHOUSE, JR.*

Legal Problems of the Design Professional
LEGAL ASPECTS

OF ARCHITECTURE

&

ENGINEERING

AND

THE

Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1970. Pp. xliii. 953. $12.50.
There is no profession, other than the law, that can compare with
architecture and engineering in its involvement with legal problems and
relationships. Legal questions inhere in every stage of the design
professional's dealings with his partners, clients, contractors, insurance,
and bonding companies, and in the daily execution of the building
project. The architect or engineer, for example, must comply with the
licensing or registration laws of the states in which he practices; he must
organize the entity through which he practices; he is required to contract
with his client for the furnishing of professional services, and with
consultants to assist in the execution of such services. Perhaps most
significantly, the design professional is called upon to assist his client in
the formulation of the construction contract. This document involves
such complex legal subjects as liability and other insurance, liens,
payment and performance bonds, indemnification, arbitration, default,
and liquidated damages.
The legal rights, obligations, and remedies of the design
professional are continuously being defined and modified by the courts
and legislatures. The architect and engineer have been particularly
concerned in recent years with the increasing number of malpractice
suits instituted against them by the workmen and other persons injured
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS. By Justin Sweet. St.

*

Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. LL.B. 1938, Temple University.
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during construction of building projects. The area of legal liability to
third persons has not been static, and the responsibilities chargeable to
design professionals seem to be expanding. Although there is concern in
the profession about this trend, efforts on the part of professional
associations to provide form contracts that define certain functions and
responsibilities have not been wholly successful. In addition to
malpractice problems, the architect or engineer is concerned with the
scope of protection provided by common law and statutory copyright
for his design, the security furnished by liens for the collection of his fee,
and, of course, the limitations imposed by the zoning and building codes
on what he may design.
It would appear from this brief summary that the design
professional must be basically acquainted with the potential legal
problems that invariably arise. To meet this need, Professor Justin
Sweet, of the University of California Law School, has written a treatise
on legal aspects of architecture and engineering, a work that had its
genesis in teaching materials Professor Sweet developed for a course for
architecture students. The objective of this book is to provide a
background that will enable architectural and engineering students to
acquire an understanding of law and legal institutions. In achieving this
objective, Professor Sweet has been eminently successful. The book,
however, also can be of significant assistance to practicing design
professionals and to the lawyers who represent them.
Professor Sweet has divided his treatise into five major parts. Part I
constitutes a review of basic contract principles, the agency relationship,
forms of association, and judicial procedures. Although this section is
quite fundamental, it serves the purpose of exploring some of the basic
premises that underlie more subtle and complex problems of law. Part II
deals with the the design professional's relationship with his client. The
architect or engineer's contract with his client is the most significant
document in the entire construction process. It sets forth his
responsibilities, the client's obligations, and the method and amount of
compensation. The architect or engineer not only creates the design, but
in most instances he administers the construction contract. Many of the
legal disputes that arise are the result of a misunderstanding of his
function during construction. Part III of the treatise analyzes laws
relating to land. As noted by Professor Sweet, the development of a
concept for a building project requires an awareness in the designer of
legal limitations upon the use of land. Therefore, the nature of
ownership, the meanings of such doctrines as adverse possession and
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eminent domain, and the varieties of land use planning are, among other
subjects, of direct interest to the practicing design professional.
The legal problems associated with the construction process are
discussed in Part IV. During both the preparation of the construction
contract and the course of construction, the architect or engineer is
under the most pressure to become involved in legal questions.
Correspondingly, the average design professional is the least equipped to
find his way in this area. In the development of the construction
contract, the type and nature of insurance and surety bonds must be
determined. A change procedure must be provided in the contract and
appropriate provision must be made for the amount and manner in
which the contractor is to be compensated for extra work. The
construction contract must not only protect the contractor's right to
appropriate compensation but also assure the owner of a sound building
project. Public contracts have special requirements that may relate to the
nature of the specifications or involve such peripheral issues as
discrimination in employment and the consequences of refusing to testify
before a grand jury. During the construction process, legal questions
may arise because of mistakes in a contractor's bid. The construction
contract, moreover, requires interpretation, particularly when there is
more than one prime contractor. Claims by the contractor for damages
arising from alleged delay on the part of the owner or design
professional, and claims by the owner for damages against the
contractor for his delay are common occurrences. Professor Sweet's
treatise explores all of these problems and incorporates illustrative court
decisions.
Perhaps distinct in the practice of architecture and engineering, the
design professional acts not only as the agent for the owner but also as
an arbiter between owner and contractor with respect to the performance
of the contractor. He interprets the contract documents, grants
extensions of time to perform, issues or withholds certificates of
payment, and condemns work for defective material or faulty
workmanship. Professor Sweet deals with the legal aspects of this
decision-making. He raises the issue of whether such determinations
should be made final under the construction contract, and whether the
design professional can shed his primary role as the owner's agent and
become a neutral and fair judge. Although the treatise does not discuss
at length legal decisions granting or withholding immunity to the design
professional in his role as an arbiter, it brings this issue to the attention
of the reader.
Part V of the book examines certain professional practice
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problems, such as the professional liability of architects and engineers,
the availability of insurance, the licensing requirements of professional
practice, and the property rights of the professional in his design.
Professor Sweet points out the reasons for increased litigation involving
professionals and the breakdown by judicial decision of many of the
older concepts that formed a barrier against broad liability. For
example, he documents the demise of the privity rule and the attack on
the doctrine that the design professional cannot be liable for injuries
arising from hazardous methods of contractors in constructing a project.
In this context, Professor Sweet explains the importance of defining and
limiting the professional's function in his contract with the owner and of
securing appropriate liability insurance. He also reviews the significance
of indemnification provisions contained in the construction contract that
can protect the owner and the architect against liability when the
primary tortfeasor is the contractor.
In the text of his work, Professor Sweet refers to the standard
contracts issued by the American Institute of Architects; these contracts
and other documents are reproduced in the appendix. These forms are
useful and significant tools, but they should not be used by rote. Rather,
they should be carefully adapted to particular projects. These forms have
been subject to modification over the years, many of the forms
reproduced in this treatise are no longer current because they were
modified in 1970.
Professor Sweet's treatise fills a need and a void. Published
materials on this subject have not been oriented to classroom use. Each
of the book's chapters not only dicusses a legal aspect in the practice of
architects and engineers, but also contains review questions, questions
for class discussion, and problems for consideration and resolution.
Architecture and engineering schools should find this book a valuable
tool. Its value, however, is not limited to the student-the active design
professional and his legal counsel also should find it of significant
assistance.
NORMAN

A.

COPLAN*

*Counsel, New York Association of Architects. Member of New York Bar. B.A., 1940, J.D.,
1942, Columbia University.

